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As early as 1930, critics such as Stuart Gilbert have approached James Joyce’s Ulysses as 
a book that resembles an organism; this tendency to analogize the book as a living body 
continues more recently through the work of such scholars as Sebastian D. G. Knowles (2001). 
However, viewing the book as a body, rather than a body-mind, has allowed scholars to ignore 
the interplay between Ulysses’s unusual physical “body” and the book’s own agency. This thesis 
looks specifically at the schemata, a set of charts accompanying the text whose authorial 
complexities and nonstandardized contents are often unaddressed in discussions of Ulysses as an 
organism, in conjunction with the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode, which is assigned the organ 
of “Brain” in the schemata and is therefore set up as a site of interplay between the physical and 
mental within the text. By reading the schemata and “Scylla and Charybdis” together through the 
lens of a posthuman understanding of distributed agency, this thesis explores how Ulysses, as a 
text with a body-mind, approaches the relationships between book, author, and reader as 
constantly under revision. Ultimately, “Scylla and Charybdis” shows that, in Ulysses, the self—
whether it is a human self or an inhuman book-self—is a set of mutable forms held together by 
memory. Because of this, each “self” or “whole” is constantly being reinterpreted, leading to a 
breakdown of seemingly definite boundaries and a reevaluation of the nature of identity. 
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Figure 1: The original Gilbert schema, 2 
Figure 2: A 2008 version of the Gilbert schema, 10 





Act. Be acted on. 
—Ulysses 
 In a letter to his friend Carlo Linati, James Joyce described his book Ulysses as “an epic 
of two races (Israelite-Irish) and at the same time the cycle of the human body as well as a little 
story of a day (life)” (Gilbert, Letters 146). This description emphasizes the strange, paradoxical 
qualities of Joyce’s book. Ulysses is simultaneously an epic and a “little story,” the tale of two 
races and the tale of a single body, the story of a day and of a life, incredibly large yet 
mundanely small. Moreover, Joyce’s description of the book as “the cycle of the human body” 
seems to have captured the attention of commentators. For example, one early Irish response to 
the book called Ulysses “a human book” in praise of Joyce’s attention to a certain realism in his 
portrayal of the “fundamental human attributes” (Deming 296). However, Ulysses is not only a 
psychologically “human” book but a book that emphasizes physiology. As this thesis discusses, 
the schemata are one particular aspect of the text that emphasize both Ulysses’s attention to the 
body and its overall strangeness as a book. Fig. 1 shows an early schema to Ulysses, as printed in 
Stuart Gilbert’s James Joyce’s Ulysses, originally published in 1930. This schema includes 
interpretive material as well as orienting information such as episode titles, the time of day each 
episode takes place, and the “Scene” at which the action occurs.1 Most notably, Gilbert includes 
the “Organ” assigned to each episode. By assigning the book “Flesh” and “Blood,” Gilbert’s 
schema emphasizes Ulysses’s unusual attention to biology, an attention that is echoed within the 
text by the way the book morphs and grows, almost organically, from episode to episode. As I 
                                                          
1 I use the word “episodes” to describe the divisions of Ulysses; although some do refer to them 
as chapters, “episodes” is often used in acknowledgement of the fact that each episode is 
analogous to a part of the Homeric Odyssey. In a thesis so concerned with analogy, I find it best 
to keep Ulysses’ most well-known analog in mind. 
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focus on in this thesis, the assignment of a “Brain” to “Scylla and Charybdis” suggests that 
Ulysses’s psychological depth is couched in a physiological understanding of the body. Not only 
are the characters in this book psychologically complex, but the book itself is given the organ of 
thought. 
 
Fig. 1. The original Gilbert schema from Stuart Gilbert, James Joyce's Ulysses: A Study, New 
York: Vintage, 1955, p. 30 
 Envisioning Joyce’s book as a body has long been used as a mode of clarifying Ulysses’s 
often confusing structure. As early as 1930, critics such as Gilbert were relating Ulysses to a 
living thing, in particular due to the schematic assignment of organs to the episodes of the book. 
The schemata are, in many ways, an analogy machine, and as I discuss in this thesis, they are 
often more confounding than clarifying; however, Gilbert uses the analogy of a “living 
organism,” prompted by the schemata, as a way of understanding how the apparently disjointed 
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episodes of Ulysses function together (James Joyce’s Ulysses 29, note 1). More recently, 
Sebastian D. G. Knowles’ book The Dublin Helix: The Life of Language in Joyce’s Ulysses 
(2001) approaches wordplay in Ulysses as a mode of creating a living text: “In Ulysses, words 
are alive: Joyce reveals the inner life of words through puzzles, puns, riddles, acrostics, 
anagrams, and the occasional spelling test” (26). For Knowles, the interrelated episodes of the 
book are not the only feature that makes it resemble an organism; instead, language constructs 
the book as a living body. Applying the language of molecular genetics to his reading of the 
book, Knowles argues that “Letters carry language as a gene carries life, messengers for 
reproduction and representation” (26). Like Gilbert, Knowles approaches the book as a symbolic, 
metaphorical body in order to understand how the parts of the book function in tandem. 
However, other scholars have presented more literal ways of looking at books as bodies. 
N. Katherine Hayles’ 2013 essay, “Combining Close and Distant Reading: Jonathan Safran 
Foer's Tree of Codes and the Aesthetic of Bookishness,” notes that the rise of electronic reading 
has emphasized print books’ physicality: “Unlike information, print books have bodies” (226). 
Hayles draws attention to the importance of the physical book, what she terms the “book-body,” 
in how readers interact with and draw meaning from a text. Her primary example is Jonathan 
Safran Foer’s die-cut book, Tree of Codes, and she explains the die-cuts as a way of enhancing 
textual meaning but also of emphasizing the book’s physicality, noting that “Foer’s book-body 
has become a life-form, its holes acting as cellular structures” like those of a tree (230). Hayles 
uses this analogy to exemplify the importance of physical perceptions of art, illustrating that 
analogizing the book-body as a living thing is useful in coming to an understanding of how the 
reader’s body interacts with the book’s. In this thesis, I build upon Hayles’ essay in conjunction 
with Gilbert’s and Knowles’ work. Rather than look at Ulysses’s body as just a metaphor, I look 
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at the book as both a metaphorical “organism” and as a book-body. As this thesis shows, 
exploring the relationship between the book and the schemata in this way produces new 
questions about what a book’s body can be. 
 The current moment provides new ways of approaching Ulysses in terms of blurred 
boundaries: between the book and the schemata, for example, but also between author and text, 
subject and object, even human and inhuman. Posthumanism, which has grown increasingly 
prevalent in recent decades, suggests that the view of a book as “human” or “organism” should 
be interrogated in light of new ways of conceiving of agency. Accordingly, this thesis not only 
discusses Ulysses as a body, but puts that body in the context of its relationship to Ulysses as a 
text, specifically the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode. Hayles’ landmark text, How We Became 
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999) explains the 
posthuman view of agency:  
the presumption that there is an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and 
clearly distinguished from the ‘wills of others’ is undercut in the posthuman, for 
the posthuman’s collective heterogeneous quality implies a distributed cognition 
located in disparate parts that may be in only tenuous communication with one 
another. (3-4) 
Posthumanism posits that the self and the “other” are not as separate as traditional models of 
agency hold them to be. Hayles proposes “distributed cognition” as a mode of envisioning the 
fuzziness of boundaries between agents; “The posthuman subject,” she says, “is an amalgam, a 
collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries 
undergo continuous construction and reconstruction,” and because of the constant renegotiation 
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of boundaries of the self-subject, agency must be evaluated as also under constant renegotiation 
(How We Became Posthuman 3). 
 The idea that agents have mutable boundaries has direct implications for how art and 
artistry is conceptualized in a book like Ulysses. The anthropologist Alfred Gell argues that art 
objects—what he calls “indexes”—can be used as an extension of a person’s agency: “the index 
is not simply a ‘product’ or end-point of action, but rather a distributed extension of an agent” 
(ix). As I discuss in this thesis, a similar point is brought up in “Scylla and Charybdis” through 
Stephen Dedalus’ discussion of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, in which Stephen conceptualizes 
Shakespeare as a “ghost” within his own text. Although Stephen gives the art/index itself a great 
deal of power, too, he describes art as containing a permanent imprint of the author, thus 
becoming an extension of the author in a way that closely resembles Gell’s agent/index 
relationship. Gell’s “distributed agent” and Hayles’ “distributed cognition” provide a mode by 
which to visualize the full implications of Stephen’s argument as a metatextual exploration of 
Ulysses itself. Questions about the relationship between author and text, and the agency of each 
in constant relationship to one another, become the central concern of “Scylla and Charybdis” 
when viewed in this light. This suggests that, while Ulysses may in some sense be a “human” 
text, it also anticipates many of the posthuman ideas of agency not raised by Hayles and Gell 
until half a century later. 
 Furthermore, this implies that scholars who have analogized Ulysses as a body in order to 
conceptualize the structural complexities of the text have missed, in their appraisal, important 
elements of what makes Ulysses as strange and confounding as it is. Specifically, the use of the 
schemata to clarify the text, rather than acknowledging how these documents blur the edges of 
the book, ignores an opportunity to interrogate how the theory of art latent in “Scylla and 
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Charybdis” and the peculiarities of Ulysses’s shape and textual history combine to reveal a view 
of agency as distributed and codependent, even while individual agency is acknowledged. 
 This thesis therefore takes up Hayles’ description of the posthuman subject as “a 
material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and 
reconstruction” and applies it to the book. To do so, it is necessary to keep in mind that Ulysses 
is not simply an organism in terms of being a symbolic body or collection of cells but a 
“material-informational entity,” which I analogize as a body-mind out of respect to Ulysses’s 
insistence upon the organic, biological nature of both the text and those who encounter it. The 
OED defines “body-mind” (or its equivalent term “mind-body”) as “A living being which has 
both mental and material elements, or which is a composite of a mind and a body…. Also: 
mental and bodily processes considered as being causally interrelated” (“mind-body, n. and 
adj.”). Therefore, I use “body-mind” and not “body/mind” or “body and mind” to emphasize the 
interrelational nature of what is traditionally seen as a binary opposite of physical versus 
spiritual. 
Many argue that “body-mind” is not a perfect term and that it in fact reinforces many of 
the binary ways of thinking that this thesis and, indeed, posthumanism generally seeks to 
combat. The introduction to Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: The Early Modern 
Body-Mind (2014) makes such a case: 
[Even] the label body-mind, of course, bears traces of the two connected 
dichotomous assumptions that our contributors seek to combat: the ideas that 
mind and body each name a unified set of phenomena held together by unique 
properties, and that there is thus a single problem about how they relate or 
connect. (Johnson 1) 
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While I agree with this complaint, I find that, in Joyce and in Ulysses particularly, “body-mind” 
is actually a fitting term due to its own somewhat contradictory nature. As this thesis discusses, 
Stephen’s Hamlet theory explores art and artist as constantly playing with body, mind, and their 
relationship to one another.  Joyce does not necessarily view the body or the mind as non-
separable, nor does he by any means view them as completely separate: there is instead a highly 
permeable, constantly renegotiated barrier between the two.  In this thesis, “body-mind” is not 
meant to indicate body and mind as mostly separate with one simple point of connectivity. 
Instead, “body-mind” can be seen as similar to one of Joyce’s many portmanteaus: elements of 
“body” and “mind” combine and thus are changed, yet at the same time, the echo of their 
separate meanings remains, perpetually confounding the combination of the two. It is this 
paradox between separateness and interdependence that this thesis sets out to explore. 
 Therefore, Chapter 1 begins by discussing the schemata as a set of documents. This 
chapter gives context to the schemata, including some history of their formations, the variance 
between versions, and how they are approached in early criticism and later discussions, such as 
those by Knowles, but the main function of this chapter is to discuss how the schemata 
emphasize the book’s physicality and construct the book as a body-mind. As this chapter shows, 
the schemata are not a straightforward guide to the text of Ulysses but an additional complicating 
factor in attempting to define the book’s boundaries. 
 From there, Chapter 2 moves to a discussion of Stephen’s Hamlet thesis in the “Scylla 
and Charybdis” episode. Stephen’s argument, which positions him in opposition to a Neoplatonic 
view of art, reveals a metatextual theory of Ulysses and its relationship to the schemata. To be 
more precise, Stephen’s argument envisions a theory of art in which the author is not simply a 
great mind producing work but a body-mind which produces an embodied text. Shakespeare’s 
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Hamlet, for example, is embodied through its enactment upon the stage, making the text a body-
mind in the sense that it is both physical (in that the actors overtly give the text a body) and 
minded (in that the text is a collection of ideas). Furthermore, Stephen’s Hamlet thesis highlights 
that the author is mutable, held together into a single identity by memory. As I show, this 
argument suggests a reading of the relationship between book and schemata in which the 
schemata function as memory in relation to the book’s body-mind, holding the shifting physical 
forms of Ulysses together through an accrual of culturally remembered interpretive material. The 
body-mind is therefore not only presented as inseparable in relation to the author but also in 
relation to the text, and moreover, the body-mind is a mutable form. 
 In Chapter 3, I return to a traditional reading of the schemata, using the schematic 
elements to inform a reading of “Scylla and Charybdis.” Using the schemata as a guiding 
analytical tool, I discuss how “Scylla and Charybdis” approaches the book’s role in preservation 
and memory and constructs the book as a “thinking” agent that simultaneously depends upon and 
seeks independence from the author. While text and author are doubtlessly inextricably linked 
according to Stephen’s thesis, the relationship between the two is a complicated interplay that I 
suggest is akin to the firing of neurons in a brain. This relationship is such that both author and 
book are given leave to grow and adapt separately from one another, despite their bond, almost 
like a parent and child. 
 Ultimately, “Scylla and Charybdis” is a complex expression of the role of memory, both 
individual and cultural, in the construction of mutable “wholes”: people, authors, and texts. In 
Ulysses, memory functions as a primary point of linkage between agents who are changeable and 
separable, yet inextricably intertwined through an array of constantly renegotiated boundaries. 
As this thesis shows, long before posthuman theory, or even theories of the absent author such as 
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those presented by Barthes and Foucault, James Joyce was using literature as a medium by which 
to explore agency in a way that perpetually blurs the borders between author, text, and reader. 
Regarding Ulysses as a body-mind with a brain allows us to trace our way along these blurred 










Fig. 2. A 2008 version of the Gilbert schema from James Joyce, Ulysses, Ed. Jeri Johnson, 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008, p. 734-735 
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Before turning in the next chapters to the content of “Scylla and Charybdis” and the 
particular relevance of this episode to discussions of a theory of literature, it is important to turn 
our attention to how Ulysses invites the reader to approach this book as an experiment in form 
and, particularly, as an inhuman body-mind. The way that the schemata construct Ulysses as an 
explicitly biological object allows the readings of “Scylla and Charybdis” that I present in 
Chapters 2 and 3 in which Ulysses is regarded as a biological product, almost like a child; that is, 
to read the content of “Scylla and Charybdis” as an exploration of art and authorship, we must 
first understand how Ulysses calls attention to its own authorial and formal irregularities. 
Contrary to popular approaches to the schemata, in which they are viewed as explanations of or 
guides to the book, I show that the schemata actually confuse the authorship, boundaries, and 
physical form of the book. Ironically, although the schemata came about as a way of orienting 
readers in a dizzyingly complex text, they begin to defamiliarize the book upon closer scrutiny, 
making Ulysses even less book-like than one might expect. Ulysses is made into a body-mind 
whose edges are indistinct, making it difficult to approach this text as one would a more 
traditional book in which the boundaries, such as those between text and not-text or those 
between biological and artificial, are more distinct. The result is a book that questions its own 
status as “book” in anticipation of Stephen’s exploration in “Scylla and Charybdis.” 
A schema, to put it very simply, is “a diagrammatic representation” or “outline” of 
something, in this case, a book (“schema, n.”). As fig. 1 and 2 show, the schemata of Ulysses are 
generally structured like charts, with each episode of the book given a numbered row and each 
category of information given a column.2 For example, the schemata are where the titles of the 
episodes are recorded. Rather than being titled “Scylla and Charybdis” in the text of Ulysses 
                                                          
2 See pg. 2 for fig. 1 
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itself, the episode I discuss in this thesis is referred to by this name because, in the schemata, the 
entry under the “Title” column for this episode is “Scylla and Charybdis.” Similarly, the “Scene” 
of the episode given in the schema shown in fig. 2 is “The Library.” A setting or “Scene” may be 
apparent from the text of the episode itself, but something like the “Organ,” which for “Scylla 
and Charybdis” is “Brain,” may seem to relate to an episode only tangentially, or as a symbol or 
analogy. The schemata can therefore be used as an “outline” to the book in the sense of a 
breakdown of its parts, but they also contain interpretive information. 
These diagrams are approached as both an organizing framework and a key to 
understanding the complex symbolism of Ulysses, and various scholars choose to use them 
alongside other textual evidence or decide to set them aside entirely. Joyce himself said that the 
schemata were “a sort of summary—key—skeleton—scheme,” suggesting that the schemata are 
a framework but also an explanatory tool, and scholars and readers alike have used them 
accordingly (Gilbert, Letters 146). C. H. Peake, for example, argues that the “Organs” given in 
the schemata have limited usefulness in understanding Ulysses, which he likens to a portrait of 
Dublin: 
My own feeling is that the pattern of ‘organs’ (like that of the Odyssean parallels, 
though less importantly) does contribute to the total image of a city whose moral 
and intellectual life is diseased—with the reservation that, while some parts of the 
scheme operate powerfully and meaningfully, others (the ‘kidney’, for instance) 
are more ingenious than functional. (147) 
In Peake’s view, the “Organs” serve a function to a limited extent; they remind the reader of the 
common analogy of a city to a body, thus suggesting that Dublin as shown in Ulysses can be 
represented by a (diseased) body. However, Peake acknowledges that not all of the “Organs” 
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correspond to a part of the body politic and implies that some organs do not enhance readings of 
the text when examined individually. In this way, he downplays the authority of the schemata: 
they are suggestions rather than rules, a convenient tool that can be used but can just as easily be 
set aside when it ceases to be useful. While it is certainly true that not everyone agrees on how 
much deference scholars should give to the schemata, Peake’s approach sets aside the schemata’s 
troublesomeness more neatly than I wish to. Part of his trouble, it seems to me, is that he handles 
the schemata as one might handle a summary or a guidebook, rather than a part of the book 
experience that should be interrogated as one would a part of a literary text. 
Even when the schemata are used to read Ulysses as an organism, they are approached as 
evidence of a relatively straightforward analogy between Ulysses and a living body: Gilbert 
claims that “Together these [organs] compose the whole body, which is thus a symbol of the 
structure of Ulysses, a living organism, and of the natural interdependence of the parts between 
themselves” (James Joyce’s Ulysses 29, note 1). Gilbert sees the “Organs” as a way of thinking 
about the book structurally, which helps to clarify the apparent disjointedness between episodes; 
however, the footnote I have quoted here does not address the questions raised by the “Organs,” 
such as the problem of whether they actually compose a “whole body” (they do not, if by 
“whole” Gilbert means “containing all the organs a literal body would need to function”) or what 
the full implications of reading a book as a “living organism” are. Like Gilbert, Knowles notes 
that the Linati schema “hints that the book is to be read as a body and acts as an architectural 
blueprint for the three-dimensional mapping of the book” (28). Knowles’ idea of a “blueprint” 
implies that he, too, sees the schemata as a guide to the book’s structure (what he terms 
“architecture”) and, like Gilbert, he argues that the “Organs” suggest that the book is a body. 
Gilbert and Knowles both recognize that the “Organs” in particular suggest that Ulysses should 
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be read as an organism as well as an object, but their analyses use the schemata as a way of 
clarifying the book’s structure—for Gilbert, a mode of highlighting “the natural interdependence 
of parts” and for Knowles, a way toward a “three-dimensional mapping of the book”—rather 
than approaching the schemata as an additional puzzle, another play on form in a book rife with 
stylistic and formal inconsistency. By favoring the minutiae of the text or the schematic data over 
the questions raised by the existence and structure of the schemata themselves, Gilbert and 
Knowles ignore how these documents construct Ulysses as organism-like in a way that questions 
what a book can be. The schemata make Ulysses appear alien, so oddly formed that where the 
book begins and ends and even what it is can be called into question. 
In fact, it is unusual that such documents exist at all in relation to a fictional work, and 
the way the schemata came into being is equally unusual. There are two major schemata, the 
Gilbert and Linati schemata, published under Stuart Gilbert’s and Carlo Linati’s names, 
respectively, and heavily based on correspondence between James Joyce and these men. Modern 
iterations may vary; if we compare fig. 1, the original Gilbert schema as published in James 
Joyce’s Ulysses in 1930, with fig. 2, the Gilbert schema as published in a 2008 edition of 
Ulysses, it is clear that the content of the schema is not wholly standardized.3 The 2008 version 
includes other information taken from Gilbert’s book, which was written as a comprehensive 
guide to Ulysses, in addition to the information in the original Gilbert chart. If one were to 
compare the Gilbert schema with the Linati version, one would find very similar information 
between the two, but differences in organization and some slight differences in the information 
included. Peake points out that various critics have expanded upon or revised the schemata over 
the years; for example, “the ‘Correspondences’ column [was] omitted by Gilbert” but supplied in 
                                                          
3 See pg. 2 for fig. 1 and pg. 10 for fig. 2 
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a text by Hugh Kenner (Peake 122, note 9). Thus, the schemata have grown like living organisms 
with each new addition provided by critics of the text. 
Additionally, the schemata have not always been printed alongside Ulysses. The Gilbert 
schema, for example, was published in Gilbert’s book rather than with Joyce’s text, bringing the 
authorship of the schema into question; furthermore, for contemporary readers, commentary on 
Ulysses was often more available than the text of Ulysses itself. Joyce himself points out, in a 
letter to Frank Budgen, that books like Gilbert’s guide were becoming increasingly common by 
1932: 
Now as regards your projected book, if Gorman and Louis Golding finish their 
biographies of me and if Harmsworth publishes Charles Duff’s J.J. and the plain 
reader with a preface by Herbert Read yours will be the seventh book mainly 
about a text which is unobtainable in England. (Gilbert, Letters 315) 
Kevin Birmingham notes that the censorship of Ulysses was so severe that “The transgressions of 
Ulysses were the first thing most people knew about it. A portion was burned in Paris while it 
was still only a manuscript draft, and it was convicted of obscenity in New York before it was 
even a book” (3). In England and elsewhere, Ulysses truly was, as Joyce says, “unobtainable.” 
Yet, when Ulysses was still hard to come by in England due to censorship, a plethora of writing 
on the text—and the author—had already become available to English readers. Therefore, the 
historic relationship between schemata and book is particularly strange. Many readers 
encountered schematic representations of Ulysses before encountering Ulysses itself, suggesting 
that, while we cannot be sure that the schemata are truly part of the text of Ulysses, or even 
whether they are authored by the same person, they have nevertheless shaped receptions to the 
book since its earliest publishing history. For this reason, the schemata have earned a de facto 
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place as part of the Ulysses experience, and critical attention ought to be paid to how these 
unusual documents confuse the book’s shape. 
 Ulysses’s shape draws attention to the act of reading and thereby emphasize the reader’s 
interaction with the physical text; in this way, an odd addition such as the schemata can construct 
the book as an unfamiliar body. I have discussed Gilbert and Knowles’ approaches to the 
“Organs”; for both, the “Organs” are an invitation to read the book as a biological, embodied 
form. Gilbert likens the structure of the book to a “living body,” but Knowles goes further than 
this, arguing that the “Organs” support his reading of the book as a body and, specifically, of 
words and letters as chromosomes and DNA. Both Gilbert and Knowles focus on how the text 
constructs the book’s body, emphasizing, through reference to anatomy, that the book is a 
physically embodied form. However, the existence of the schemata as part of the book-body 
draws attention to the embodiedness of Ulysses as well. In “Combining Close and Distant 
Reading,” N. Katherine Hayles points out that “print books have bodies” simply by fact of their 
physical existence, and in Hayles’ view, these “book-bodies” are the book’s actual physical 
shape rather than a symbolic or human body (226). Hayles argues that “Texts that employ their 
bodies to create narrative complexity must be read not for their words alone but also for the 
physical involvements readers undertake to access their materialities” (231). As I have discussed, 
her example is Jonathan Safran Foer’s Tree of Codes, which employs die-cut pages as a method 
of manipulating the book-body and drawing attention to the embodied nature of the text. I argue 
that the schemata have a similar physical function. When printed in the same volume as Ulysses, 
the schemata are an appendage in addition to being a textual reminder of Ulysses’s unusualness 
as a book. The lack of in-text episode titles, for example, is highlighted by the schemata’s 
inclusion of these titles, and the fact that many readers find themselves flipping between 
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episodes and schemata to orient themselves means that Ulysses requires more handling than 
other books. Even in editions of Ulysses that do not include the schemata, their absence seems 
surprising rather than natural: are they not part of many (even most) readers’ experience of 
Ulysses? Where does the book (or, indeed, its body) end, exactly? 
 Joyce himself seems to have considered the schemata part of the book’s body, even if 
they were never published under his name. Joyce’s letters to Linati reveal how he conceptualized 
the schematic diagramming of Ulysses. He prefaces his inclusion of a schema in a letter to Linati, 
which I have quoted from before: “in view of the enormous bulk and the more than enormous 
complexity of my three times blasted novel it would be better to send you a sort of summary—
key—skeleton—scheme” (Gilbert, Letters 146). As I have discussed, many scholars approach 
the schemata as a “key” to the book, but Joyce’s use of the word “skeleton” suggests a different 
nuance to the book-schema relationship. A “skeleton” is not only a framework but a part of the 
body, so by describing the schema in this way, Joyce implies that it has a place as an essential 
part of the book’s body. 
Like the “Organs,” the skeleton-schemata draw overt attention to Ulysses’s anatomy. The 
schemata suggest that the book can be read both as a biological body—which is in itself unusual 
for a book—and as a book-body that draws more attention to itself and its fundamental 
difference from a biological body than many book-bodies do. (One must not forget that the 
“Organs” are in fact episodes, nor that there are not enough “Organs” to make a complete 
organism, or that the skeleton is a set of charts.) Instead of making the book more familiar or 
approachable, constructing the book as a body has the effect of confusing the book further: it is 
inhuman and inanimate, organism and object, living and unliving, a contradiction in itself. This 
distancing from the reader—who has grown to expect biological bodies to look like a human or 
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an animal and to expect book-bodies to be fairly standard—makes Ulysses itself appear less 
book-like while simultaneously emphasizing that all books, and particularly this book, are extant 
as physical objects as well as words on a page or language processing in the reader’s or writer’s 
brain. As will be seen, this is in some ways a precursor to the argument Stephen makes in “Scylla 
and Charybdis.” 
To go a step further, the schemata also play on the body-mind relationship. The very 
word “schema” plays with the interaction between physical and mental: not only is a schema a 
diagram, a physical, visual representation, but it has also been used in psychology as early as 
1920 to denote “an automatic, unconscious coding or organization of incoming psychological 
stimuli” (“schema, n.”). In other words, while the schemata to Ulysses are certainly physical 
objects, a schema does not have to be a chart printed on paper; it can be something held in the 
mind. Even if Joyce was not aware of recently emerging psychological terminology at the time 
of writing Ulysses or its schemata, the word he uses to describe these charts, “scheme,” indicates 
a diagram or “a system of correlated things” as well, and like “schema,” it also carries 
psychological connotations: “scheme” can be “a hypothetical construction, a theory” or a “plan,” 
which implies a certain degree of thought and a more abstract existence than a physical diagram 
(“scheme, n.1”). The schemata therefore highlight an intersection between mental and physical 
and, through even such simple means as the word Joyce and others have chosen to call these 
diagrams, they emphasize the idea that text does not exist simply in the physical or mental world 
of the reader or writer but at a point of intersection where physicality, language, and 
organizational processing continuously affect one another. 
The schemata thus suggest something heretofore unexplored about how Ulysses is 
constructed as an inhuman organism-object: the book does not only have a book-body but, 
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potentially, a book-body-mind. That is, Ulysses is not simply a book that has a physical body but 
a book that acknowledges its own psychology and, in doing so, implies the existence of its own 
agency. Moreover, as a body-mind, the book’s agency is intertwined with its physicality, making 
the book-body a necessary part of the book’s expression of agency. Limiting the exploration of 
the posthuman Ulysses to the book’s embodiedness ignores the book’s own consistent references 
to the psychological, and furthermore, as I show in the following chapters, regarding the book as 
a body-mind becomes a useful way of regarding the relationship between the book’s unusual 
shape and its status as agent. Reading “Scylla and Charybdis” in particular in light of my reading 
of the schemata both reinforces reading the schemata as I do and reveals the book’s own 





The Revision of Hamlet 
 “Scylla and Charybdis” is the longest and most complex episode in Ulysses that focuses 
on Stephen Dedalus. Furthermore, this episode marks a turning point for Stephen; not only is it 
the first time that the schemata assign an organ to a Stephen-centric episode,4 suggesting that 
Stephen is undergoing some change, but, as Margot Norris explains, “Scylla and Charybdis” lays 
out a scene in which many of the conflicts in Stephen’s plotline have the potential to be resolved. 
“Scylla and Charybdis” therefore becomes a climactic moment. Stephen finds himself in the 
library with a group of men (all of whom were living and working in Dublin in 1904), most 
notably George Russell (AE)5 and John Eglinton.6  AE is particularly important; the historical 
AE was a leading member of the growing Irish literary renaissance taking place in Dublin at the 
time of the book’s events (Kain 15).7 With this audience, Stephen decides to present the theory 
on Hamlet that Buck Mulligan mentions to Haines in the first episode: “[Stephen] proves by 
algebra that Hamlet’s grandson is Shakespeare’s grandfather and that he himself is the ghost of 
his own father” (U 18). In essence, Stephen argues that the play Hamlet must be looked at in 
conjunction with the events of Shakespeare’s life, and Stephen plays out the connection between 
                                                          
4 As C. H. Peake points out, the first three episodes of Ulysses, which focus on Stephen, are not 
assigned an organ. Peake suggests that this is because the organs represent the “body politic” and 
that the first three episodes “concern a solitary young man outside the city limits” (142-143). 
However, theories abound as to what prompts the introduction of organs after the third episode. 
5 George William Russell (1867-1935), pseudonymously known as AE: “poet, painter, 
philosopher… [and] luminous center of the Irish Revival” (Kain 11-15). He was also well-known 
for his mysticism (15). 
6 Pen name of William Kirkpatrick Magee (1868-1961): assistant librarian at the National 
Library, literary critic, involved in the Irish Renaissance (Ross 461). 
7 Encyclopaedia Britannica defines this movement as a “flowering of Irish literary talent at the 
end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century that was closely allied with a strong 




Shakespeare and the character Hamlet such that he proves Shakespeare to be both King Hamlet 
and Prince Hamlet, making Hamlet/Shakespeare “the ghost of his own father.” This is an 
intentionally convoluted line of reasoning, meant to impress Stephen’s well-read audience, but 
the argument that unfolds is also carefully crafted to convey Stephen’s resistance to aligning 
himself too closely with the Irish literary renaissance. Through his Hamlet example, Stephen 
argues for a theory of art that goes against AE’s Neoplatonist model and draws specific attention 
to the artist’s body-mind, and this fundamental disagreement between AE and Stephen 
underlines Stephen’s struggle to forge a place for himself in the classist Dublin literary sphere. 
Stephen’s theory of art ultimately does two things: first, it gives Stephen a certain mutability as 
an artist that AE’s idealization of the artist might not, and second, it implies that Ulysses can also 
be seen as mutable. This flexibility towards identity and the stability of form suggests that the 
schemata can be read as part of Ulysses, regardless of the many critical problems I have outlined 
in Chapter 1. 
 To fully appreciate the importance of Stephen’s disagreement with AE, some background 
is needed. Norris points out that “Scylla and Charybdis” is a crucial moment for Stephen because 
it is possibly his only remaining chance to ingratiate himself with Dublin’s most influential 
writers (1). It is imperative to his career that he ingratiate himself to AE in particular, since the 
historical AE was a major figure in the Irish literary renaissance, and accordingly, the literary AE 
clearly wields influence in this library. Of particular importance is the fact that AE is creating a 
compilation of young poets’ work: “Mr. Russell, rumour has it, is gathering together a sheaf of 
our younger poets’ verses” (U 184). This is exactly the sort of publication in which a young, 
unpublished artist like Stephen would wish to be included. If Stephen, a relative nobody, 
challenges AE, he is essentially challenging a well-known, well-established Irish nationalist art 
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movement—probably not a popular stance to take in 1904 Dublin—and furthermore, he is 
hurting his chances of being included in AE’s publication, which would significantly aid his 
career. 
 Yet Stephen openly and fundamentally disagrees with AE as to the relationship between 
body and mind in art. Early in the episode, AE outlines his Neoplatonist position on the ideal of 
art: “Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences” (U 177). As humorous as AE’s 
idealization of art that reveals the “formless” is in a book that draws constant attention to its own 
physicality and form, AE’s position carries serious philosophical implications: that art reveals 
the “spiritual” yet “formless” and is therefore distanced from the body, seeking instead to 
describe a world of pure mind. He notes that “The painting of Gustave Moreau is the painting of 
ideas,” emphasizing again that art is meant to revolve around the mental: paintings, according to 
AE, depict ideas, not people or physical objects. In AE’s view, the existence of an idea behind or 
in the art is more important than the physical existence of the art or the artist. Rather than 
viewing the body and mind as equal or interrelational, AE elevates the role of the mind above 
that of the body, as if seeking to separate the two. 
Although AE acknowledges the role of the artist, he focuses on the mental: “The supreme 
question about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring” (U 177). Certainly, “life” 
nods to the theoretical existence of a body, but the “deep life” that AE describes seems to be a 
deep mental life rather than a physical experience: “The deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of 
Hamlet bring our mind into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas” (177). 
“Deep” life may be ambiguous, but next to “deepest poetry,” defined as that which brings the 
reader’s mind into contact with a “world of ideas,” AE’s concern with the artist appears to be 
primarily a concern with the artist’s ability to think, to have a deep inner life. Therefore, in AE’s 
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view, and by extension in the view of the writers of the Irish literary renaissance, an artist’s 
worth might be measured by their ability to transcend physicality; the ideal of the mind is to 
escape the body, and the ideal of art is to be ideas produced by minds. Again, this focus on mind 
over body reinforces the idea of body and mind as separate rather than an intertwined body-
mind. 
 Stephen quickly refutes AE’s position, taking up an Aristotelian stance of his own in 
which art is necessarily physical in addition to spiritual or mental. He opens his argument by 
presenting a scene in which Shakespeare plays the role of the ghost of Hamlet’s father on the 
Elizabethan stage: “To a son he speaks, the son of his soul, the prince, young Hamlet and to the 
son of his body, Hamnet Shakespeare, who has died in Stratford that his namesake may live 
forever” (U 181). Stephen thereby prefaces his argument with an assumption: a character, a 
creation of art, “the son of [a] soul,” is comparable to—and almost synonymous with—“the son 
of [a] body,” a biological child. This synonymy suggests that the character itself is a body-mind, 
rather than a disembodied vehicle for ideas, while also underlining that art is the product of both 
a body and a soul: the authorial body-mind. Additionally, Stephen draws attention to the physical 
reality of performance. This “son of [Shakespeare’s] soul” is also “Burbage, the young player 
who stands before him,” an actor on the Elizabethan stage (U 181). The son of the soul is thus 
rendered literally physical, in addition to being the product of a body.  Rather than presenting 
Shakespeare’s art as founded only on ideas, Stephen emphasizes the enmeshment of ideas with 
physicality: a dramatic character can be made flesh and can be tied inextricably to the product of 
the artist’s flesh, and thus, the product of the artist’s mind can both be embodied and be the 
product of a body. Whereas AE emphasizes the mental production of an art that focuses on 
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“spiritual essences” and “ideas,” Stephen underlines the importance of the body-mind both in 
producing art and in the art product itself. 
 This line of thought carries over from a theory of art and art production to a theory of the 
artist. AE’s artist is removed, idealized, theoretical: he puts Shakespeare in the same category as 
Shelley and Gustave Moreau, both of whom are canonical artists of the type one might invoke if 
one were to conjure up the idea of a “true artist,” someone who has the respect of being 
universally regarded as a genius and who is consequently put upon a pedestal (U 177). The 
disconnect between body and mind in AE’s theory adds to the sense of idealization of the artist. 
Rather than allowing the artist a human body, AE envisions the artist as a larger-than-life “great 
mind.” Stephen makes fun of AE’s tendency to view the artist in this way in a moment of free 
indirect discourse a page later: “Through spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood they 
[AE and the other men in the library] creepycrawl after Blake’s buttocks into eternity of which 
this vegetable world is but a shadow” (178). The “eternity” that Stephen references is 
presumably AE’s Platonic “world of ideas,” since the “vegetable” (or organic, physical, 
biological) world can only be a “shadow” of this place. The “spaces smaller than red globules of 
man’s blood” that one must crawl through to reach “eternity” implies that there is no room for 
“man’s blood,” what makes a person human, in this space. So, in Stephen’s mind, AE’s ideal 
necessarily leaves the human behind in order to grovel after “Blake’s buttocks.” Blake, like 
Shelley or like Irish literary renaissance writers such as Yeats and AE, is a mystic, yet Stephen 
has ironically pared him down to a mere set of buttocks—a part of the artist which, in AE’s 
transcendental view of artistry, should be irrelevant. Clearly, Stephen is mocking AE’s idea of 
the artist as a larger-than-life figure to be crawled after in veneration as if he were a god rather 
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than, as Stephen’s synecdoche points out, an assemblage of human parts. Stephen views AE’s 
tendency toward body/mind separation as unrealistic and even laughable in its impracticality. 
 Stephen’s thesis instead chooses to emphasize the human flaws of the author, taking 
Shakespeare off the pedestal and reinstating his humanity. As Norris points out, the artist’s body 
inserts itself into the cerebral artistic process in more ways than one: “poets are first of all living 
human creatures with hungers and thirsts and sexual and financial needs before they are creators 
of immortal words and art” (9). In other words, in Norris’ view, Stephen’s exchange with AE 
emphasizes Stephen’s awareness of the practical needs of the artist: their physical and economic 
necessities. Norris notes AE’s criticism of Stephen’s heavy investigation of Shakespeare’s 
biography, which AE calls “‘[p]eeping and prying into greenroom gossip of the day, the poet’s 
drinking, the poet’s debts’” and points out that “These lines perversely boomerang on Stephen, in 
a reversal of AE’s point, as he imagines them pointed against himself, his own poet’s drinking 
and poet’s debts—including the one owed to Russell himself” (qtd. in Norris 8-9, 9). Norris’ 
reading shows that while AE tends to disregard the shameful realities of the artistic body—
drinking, debts, debauchery—Stephen is not only aware of these realities but actually 
emphasizes them, resisting AE’s philosophical tendency to discount the bodily experience of the 
author. According to Stephen’s Hamlet theory, the artist relies on body and mind in relation to 
one another to produce art, just as art itself engages with bodies and ideas in relation—like 
Burbage, the body enacting the ideas of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
This suggests that, for Stephen and for Joyce, the Neoplatonist theory presented by AE 
and representative of the Irish literary renaissance’s thinking does not account for the full bodily 
experience of being Irish. The Irish literary renaissance was primarily led by mystics whose 
socioeconomic standing was higher than that of Stephen Dedalus, suggesting that Stephen’s 
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emphasis on the interrelational body-mind has class dimensions as well as aesthetic importance. 
W. B. Yeats, the most well-known member of the movement, was a senator and a Protestant; 
likewise, AE shows his socioeconomic privilege through his ignorance of the relevance of 
poverty to Stephen’s argument: “I mean when we read the poetry of King Lear what is it to us 
how the poet lived? As for living, our servants can do that for us, Villiers de l’Isle has said” 
(Ross 3-4, U 181). Stephen, a young Catholic who, as Norris mentions, owes AE money, is far 
from having servants to care for his day-to-day bodily needs, so AE’s argument falls a bit flat. 
Living—specifically, the bodily processes of staying alive—becomes much more important if 
one does not have the means to provide for oneself comfortably. A wealthy person might be able 
to afford to ignore their body, but a less well-off individual might not have that luxury. Thus, for 
Stephen, the role of the body in art is directly related to his ability, as a poor Irish Catholic, to be 
an artist. Stephen’s disagreement with AE therefore underlines the Irish literary renaissance’s 
classism and the irony that, in a country so impoverished and so affected by colonialism, the 
predominant literary movement is one that disregards the bodily experience of the writer and, in 
doing so, distances itself from young artists like Stephen who cannot afford to ignore their own 
bodies. Stephen’s insistence upon the role of the body-mind is therefore political, rather than 
simply an aesthetic disagreement, and these political undertones suggest that the stakes of this 
argument are higher than might initially meet the eye. He is, through his resistance to 
Neoplatonism, fighting for a place for himself within a relatively elitist movement. For Stephen, 
recognizing art and artist as entwining the physical and mental rather than ignoring one to focus 




 In addition to containing classist undertones, AE’s theory of art is also remarkably 
stagnant in comparison to Stephen’s. Not only does Stephen’s Hamlet theory present a theory of 
art/artist as engaging in interrelated physical and mental action, in opposition to AE’s view, but 
Stephen uses this theory to construct his human artist-self as a constantly changing set of 
physical and mental forms. Such shifting between forms would be impossible in the Neoplatonist 
model, which emphasizes essential forms (“spiritual essences”). For example, as he thinks on the 
debt he owes AE, Stephen comes up with this excuse for not paying back the money: “Wait. Five 
months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound” (U 182). He hypothesizes 
that, if the self is the self because of physical form—the molecules that make one up—then his 
self has changed so radically that it cannot be called the same “I.” Of course, Stephen 
acknowledges the clear logical flaws in this idea, and amends: “But I, entelechy, form of forms, 
am I by memory because under ever-changing forms” (182). The causation here is particularly 
striking: “I… am I by memory because under ever-changing forms” (emphasis mine). The self 
maintains some unified form by memory, by being able to reflect on a past physical or mental 
state and recognize the change over time, and the self must be anchored in memory because the 
body is constantly reformed. Every past and present physical state is therefore tied together 
through memory, a mental process that anchors the shifting forms across time. Of course, 
memory is not unchanging either; as memory expands and physical forms shift, identity is 
constantly being reformed. Stephen envisions himself not as a fixed form or essence, but as 
many forms of which memory keeps an index. Presumably, as I will elaborate upon later, 
Stephen’s view of the mutable “I” kept whole by memory could be applied to any subject—not 
just the author but the book, with cultural memory (or an index, like the schemata) standing in 
for personal memory. 
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This philosophy of mutability is further illustrated by Stephen’s contradictory views 
within his own thesis. It is tempting to read the Hamlet thesis as play-acting; as Peake puts it, 
Stephen’s thesis “is a mock literary argument, an attempt to overwhelm the audience with a show 
of learning” (205). Although Peake downplays the real thought Stephen puts into his argument, 
he is correct that Stephen’s thesis is presented very performatively. Throughout the episode, free 
indirect discourse draws attention to Stephen’s rhetorical moves. His speaking is often prefaced 
with a line such as “Local colour. Work in all you know. Make them accomplices” (U 180). This 
particular passage highlights Stephen’s (or the narration’s) consciousness of the way he frames 
his argument, attempting to make his combative audience “accomplices” to his own ideas. 
Through such moments, the episode is, in a sense, aware of its own creation and of the ulterior 
motives behind Stephen’s words. Furthermore, the episode eventually slips into the form of a 
drama, complete with stage directions such as “(Laughter.)” (U 200). This makes Stephen’s 
thesis literally a “show” of learning, although a consciously crafted and substantive show.8 
Because this thesis is presented so performatively, with ample narrative attention to Stephen’s 
rhetorical moves, and with such a convoluted central claim, it certainly seems like an act rather 
than a sincerely held belief. Stephen himself suggests as much: when John Eglinton asks, “Do 
you believe your own theory?” Stephen immediately replies, “No” (U 205). This seems to prove 
that Stephen’s thesis is, as Peake says, a “mock” argument. However, Stephen’s musing on the 
nature of the physio-mental self has shown that he views form as “ever-changing.” In his 
explanation of his thesis, Stephen links this ever-changing self overtly to the artist-self: “As we, 
or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies … so does the artist weave and unweave his 
image” (186).  While Stephen acknowledges that “mother Dana” may be what forms and reforms 
                                                          
8 For an expanded exploration of the role of drama and performativity, see Chapter 3. 
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the body (a point I will return to but which, for the time being, can be simply understood to 
imply that some other power plays a role in the formation of the body), he implies that the artist 
forms and reforms their own image. If the artist is indeed constantly creating and recreating 
themselves, then the fact that Stephen rejects his Hamlet theory immediately after presenting it 
does not necessarily refute either the Hamlet theory or the theory of art implicit in it; instead, by 
resisting consistency, Stephen proves his point. He, the artist, is ever-changing. 
By constructing himself as an artist in this way, Stephen implies that constant 
transformation is a necessary part of building artistic identity in a way that recognizes the role of 
the body. Whereas AE’s more rigid approach to form leaves little room for growth and change, 
Stephen’s emphasis on creation and recreation allows for both the growth of the artist and the 
reinterpretation of art. Stephen explains the creation and recreation of the self as “weav[ing] and 
unweav[ing]” (U 186). This is clearly a reference to Penelope in Homer’s Odyssey, the work 
after which Ulysses is named. Just as Penelope weaves and unweaves her shroud, the body or the 
artist’s image is woven and unwoven, promoting change and growth but also preventing the 
inevitable completion: of the body, through death, of the artist, through stagnation of ideas, or of 
a work such as Penelope’s shroud, through lack of reinterpretation. In a similar vein, Christine 
Van Boheemen notes that the final episode of Ulysses, “Penelope,” resists being an ending: “It is 
as if finality generated a certain anxiety in Joyce and had to be precluded. It evidently was 
related to the threat of death” (270). Throughout Ulysses, then, the image of Penelope is linked to 
an anxiety about completion, both of lives and of texts. Stephen’s implicit reference suggests that 
“ever-changing forms” applies to art as well as artist, anticipating some of the anxiety of the 
“Penelope” episode that Van Boheemen describes in her essay. Whereas AE’s view implies that 
there is an essential Hamlet, Stephen’s emphasizes that Hamlet is continually revised. For 
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example, Stephen stresses the actors performing the play—Shakespeare and Babbage—but 
Shakespeare and Babbage are only actors in the early productions of Hamlet. In fact, as Leopold 
Bloom notes much earlier in the book, a Mrs. Bandman Palmer had played the part of Hamlet the 
night before Ulysses takes place: “Hamlet she played last night. Male impersonator. Perhaps he 
was a woman” (U 73).9 The change of actors has caused Bloom to reevaluate the character: the 
part of Hamlet is being played by a woman, a “Male impersonator,” so perhaps Hamlet was a 
woman too. A play is by nature revised with each new actor, each stage, and each audience and, 
as Bloom’s pondering shows, each re-embodiment of the work causes a reevaluation by the 
viewer. Art is continually revised by shifts in cultural experience and interpretation. By making 
his argument performative, then, Stephen leaves room not only for his own development but for 
the development of his production independent of himself.10 
Therefore, Stephen’s idea that we “weave and unweave our bodies,” that all people create 
and recreate themselves in form after form, unified into an “I” by memory, also applies to art 
itself (U 186). Specifically, if the artistic product is, like the artist, an embodied form as well as 
full of ideas, making it analogous to a body-mind just as the author is a body-mind, then in 
Stephen’s theory of art, there is an implicit possibility for art to create and recreate itself, or to be 
created and recreated by “mother Dana” (186). The word “mother,” like Stephen’s attention to 
Hamlet as the “son” of Shakespeare’s body, brings to mind parental ties. A mother weaves a 
body through the gestation of a child. (How she unweaves a child is perhaps more unclear, but 
Stephen’s mother has died before the events of Ulysses begin, so there is a possibility that this is 
                                                          
9 According to Jeri Johnson’s notes to the text, Bloom is referring to the real actress Millicent 
Bandmann Palmer, who played the part of Hamlet in Dublin on June 15, 1904 (U 799, note 
73.21). 
10 This line of reasoning will be returned to and discussed in more depth in Chapter 3. 
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a nod to Stephen’s grief.) Dana, or Danu, is a Celtic mother goddess after whom the Tuatha Dé 
Danann (translated, “folk of the goddess Danu”), a tribe of gods, are named (“Tuatha Dé 
Danann”). Stephen’s reference therefore suggests that God or gods could be equally responsible 
for the “weaving and unweaving” of the individual, as much as the individual themselves. The 
fact that he references a well-known Irish goddess is in part a rhetorical flourish, acknowledging 
his audience’s nationalistic embrace of Celtic mythology, but Stephen is also familiar with Celtic 
myths and presumably knows that many goddesses in the Celtic tradition are linked to the land. 
The Modern Irish Éire, for example, is the name of a goddess of the Tuatha Dé Danann as well 
as a name for Ireland (MacKillop). “Mother Dana” can therefore be seen as many things: an Irish 
twist on a reference to God, a mother figure who weaves and unweaves bodies through gestation 
and birth, or the land Ireland, which shapes its inhabitants through their bodily experience of 
colonialism and Irishness. By acknowledging the role of “mother Dana,” Stephen implies, first, 
that to some extent, the person he is and will become, and perhaps the artist he is and will 
become, is out of his control and instead dependent upon circumstances such as divine influence, 
family, or nationality. Second, Stephen reinforces the suggestion that art may be, or become, out 
of the artist’s control: we weave our bodies, and our bodies of work, to a point, but some things 
are out of our hands. Ultimately, culture and circumstance can remake a work. 
If Stephen’s theory can be understood to apply to the form of a piece of art as well as to 
the artist who creates it, then, like with Stephen’s “I,” there must be a mechanism keeping the 
formed and reformed art whole. In the same way that Stephen knows himself to be himself by 
memory, an index of the forms he has had, a piece of art may be understood to be “itself” by a 
collective cultural memory. Hamlet is still recognizably Hamlet, even with wildly different 
reinterpretations and reimaginings and totally new bodies playing all the parts, in part because 
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reinterpretations tend to be conscious of the textual and interpretive history of the play. 
Moreover, new works can build off older traditions—like, for example, Ulysses’s use of Homer, 
Celtic myth, and Hamlet—and be understood as separate works, but they still have the potential 
to reshape a reader’s response to the older work (as a female actor playing Hamlet causes Bloom 
to rethink the character, or as Ulysses could prompt a rethinking of Homer’s Odyssey). 
The body-mind of Ulysses is therefore formed and reformed through interpretation and 
reinterpretation, but Ulysses is also made and remade internally as one goes through each 
episode’s stylistic changes. The schemata highlight this by including the “Technic” of each 
episode, which at times corresponds to a style or genre:11 “Nestor” is a “Catechism” in the 
Gilbert schema, whereas “Circe” is a “Hallucination” and “Eumaeus” a “Narrative” (U 734-735). 
However, stylistic differences between episodes are often apparent without schematic input: the 
“Aeolus” episode includes newspaper-like headlines (“WITH UNFEIGNED REGRET IT IS WE 
ANNOUNCE THE DISSOLUTION OF A MOST RESPECTED DUBLIN BURGESS”), 
whereas “Ithaca” is formatted primarily as questions and answers (“Why did absence of light 
disturb him less than presence of noise? Because of the surety of the sense of touch in his firm 
full masculine feminine passive active hand”), and many of the other episodes carry distinct 
stylistic markers as well (U 114, 627). Ulysses reinvents itself—its genre and style—with each 
new episode, weaving and unweaving its own identity or, possibly, being woven and unwoven 
by its author or circumstance. There is also a microcosm of this process within “Scylla and 
Charybdis,” as the episode begins as a narrative but includes, at various moments, snippets of 
poetry, a Gregorian chant complete with musical notation, and, as I have mentioned, a shift 
                                                          




toward dramatic formatting later on. Like Stephen’s artistic yet human body-mind, “Scylla and 
Charybdis,” and on a larger scale Ulysses, is made and remade externally (by a “mother Dana,” 
whether that is culture, interpretation, or authorial parentage) but also seems to make and remake 
itself as it shifts between genres and styles, forcing the reader to reevaluate what the book “is” at 
any moment. 
If one envisions Ulysses as a body-mind that can be formed and reformed—interpreted 
and reinterpreted, but also made and remade as one goes through each episode’s stylistic 
changes—then the schemata have played a role akin to memory in constructing Ulysses as a 
single entity. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Gilbert notes in James Joyce’s Ulysses that the organs 
in particular suggest “the natural interdependence of the parts between themselves” (29, note 1). 
The schemata, by providing frameworks that remain consistent across the episodes, emphasize 
the unification of the many forms of the book, indexing the genres (or “Technics”) that the book 
adopts. The fact that modern editors sometimes revise and reform the schematic content only 
adds to the sense that the schemata are an accrual of remembered critical information. 
Furthermore, because Stephen has outlined the possibility for art to form itself or to be formed 
by others who may not be the artist, the fact that the schemata are incredibly variable, or that 
they were not published under Joyce’s name, has little bearing on whether one sees them as part 
of Ulysses. Instead, the variations add to the impression of the schemata as a growing, changing 
accrual of remembered information. Just as a person’s memory expands and is altered over time, 
so are the schemata expanded and altered with each new version. Therefore, Stephen’s thesis 
provides a framework with which to envision the book as a mutable body-mind, and in this 
book-body-mind, textual growths such as the schemata are not only anticipated but accepted as 
part of the process of creating and maintaining a shifting text’s identity. 
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Ultimately, Stephen’s Hamlet theory is a deeply metatextual exploration of the mutability 
of art and artist, set against a staunchly Neoplatonist understanding of art in which the physical 
world has hardly any role. Stephen argues for the importance of the authorial body-mind as 
opposed to a detached artistic psyche, thus attempting to forge a place for the impoverished and 
body-aware Irish artist in the Irish literary renaissance, and he also argues for a view of art as 
having partial autonomy from the author, all while emphasizing the instability of form of both 
the human artist and the work produced. As the next chapter discusses, the theory Stephen 
outlines in “Scylla and Charybdis” lays the groundwork for a complex understanding, not only of 
the role of the body-mind in the production of art, but of the ways in which the artist interacts 





The Thinking Book 
In this chapter, I return to a more traditional approach to the schemata. As I have 
discussed in the previous chapters, readings of the schemata have the potential to be much more 
flexible than they have previously been, and using the schemata as part of the text reveals how 
Ulysses draws attention to its own strange shape, raising questions about the boundaries of the 
book and what the book “is.” Now, I again use the schemata as a “key” to the text—in this case, 
a key to “Scylla and Charybdis.” The schemata set up “Scylla and Charybdis,” which is a highly 
self-aware episode, to be the thinking center of the book by assigning it the organ “Brain.” This 
episode is where the book, in a sense, thinks itself through; the author-character Stephen ponders 
the relationship between art and artist as the book itself shifts forms as if to reflect his ideas, and 
the interplay between the schemata and the text underlines the central importance of Stephen’s 
Hamlet thesis to understanding Ulysses as a whole. 
 By listing the “Art” of “Scylla and Charybdis” as “Literature,” the schemata suggest that 
this episode in particular is thematically linked to theorization of “literature”—which I think has 
been made clear in this thesis thus far, but it is nevertheless relevant to note that the text itself 
underlines the link between this episode and “Literature” as an art form.  This directness is part 
of what separates Ulysses’s self-awareness from that of other books. Many books discuss 
literature, directly or indirectly, and many books have an awareness of their status as literature, 
but the schemata point out the exact moment where Stephen, the author-character, presents his 
own particular theory of art. The schemata set up “Scylla and Charybdis” to be the episode in 
which the production and dissemination of literature is theorized even while, through the 
schemata’s very presence, confounding conventional ideas of what a book is and how it is 
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produced. Chapter 1 discussed the schemata’s own strange authorship, and Chapter 2 discussed 
Stephen’s theory of the artist as a human body-mind; in this chapter, I show how reading the 
schemata and “Scylla and Charybdis” together reveals Joyce’s exploration of impersonal or 
disappeared authorship, formulated long before Barthes and Foucault brought these issues to the 
forefront of literary theory. Ultimately, the theories Joyce/Stephen thinks through in “Scylla and 
Charybdis” emphasize the ways in which Ulysses acts and is acted upon in conjunction with, yet 
independent of, Joyce. 
Fittingly, “Scylla and Charybdis” takes place in the National Library of Ireland (which 
the Gilbert schema refers to as “The Library,” as if it were an archetypal every-library). Stephen 
envisions this setting as graveyard-like: “Coffined thoughts around me, in mummycases, 
embalmed in spice of words” (U 186). To him, each book is a “coffin” of thoughts; thoughts 
form the body of the book in this metaphor, with the “spice of words” acting to mummify and 
preserve them. This, of course, implies that books—or at least the thoughts contained therein—
are dead and that libraries are tombs of tomes. 
This thought has implications for Stephen’s Hamlet thesis. If literature is viewed as an act 
of preservation, then Hamlet functions as a preserver of Shakespeare’s thoughts, but also his 
memories and experiences. As fig. 3 shows, Shakespeare’s lived experiences of his son 
Hamnet’s death inspires Hamlet, which then does two major things: first, Hamlet preserves the 
memory of Hamnet Shakespeare by reinterpreting and re-embodying him as Prince Hamlet, and 
second, Hamlet preserves its author as the ghost of King Hamlet. Stephen defines a ghost as 
“One who has faded into impalpability through death, through absence, through change of 
manners,” so when he calls Shakespeare a ghost in the context of Hamlet, he implies that the 
author will one day grow, change, die, or otherwise become absent; however, the dead contents 
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of the play (Hamnet, Shakespeare) are, as Stephen implies, preserved and, furthermore, the 
dramatic process of acting, and the re-embodiment and reinterpretation implied by this act, keeps 
Hamlet from becoming a completely dead text while simultaneously preserving a remnant of the 
absent author (U 180). 
 
Fig. 3. Made in PowerPoint 2016; Microsoft; Computer software. 
The acts of preservation and revival are therefore central to Stephen’s thesis.  As I have 
discussed in Chapter 2, Stephen envisions himself, and by extension the author, as an “ever-
changing form” and notes that “I… am I by memory” (U 182). In that chapter, I argued that the 
schemata act as memory in relation to Ulysses. However, whereas the schemata are in many 
ways a shared memory of analogy—one might even say of criticism—the rest of Ulysses takes 
on a function as memory in a different way. Ulysses and, indeed, any book is a physical site in 
which thoughts can be “coffined” when they are “dead”: when the author has moved on, changed 
form, perhaps even abandoned his thoughts as Stephen seems to abandon his thesis. The author 
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becomes “I by memory” in that they, as an author, are recognized by the body of work that 
preserves their thoughts. 
However, the thoughts are only dead in a limited sense. Stephen continues, noting the 
books’ apparent lack of life: “They are still. Once quick in the brains of men. Still: but an itch of 
death is in them, to tell me in my ear a maudlin tale, urge me to wreak their will” (U 186). The 
“They” he refers to is ambiguous but seems to reference the “Coffined thoughts” of the 
preceding paragraph, which suggests that thoughts “Once quick” lose their life and liveliness 
when put to the page, becoming “still.” More puzzling is the phrase “Still: but an itch of death is 
in them,” which could be read in at least two ways: first, as saying that the books are “Still,” yet 
have “an itch of death,” or second, as saying that the books are “Still,” and have only “an itch of 
death” instead of a full death. Reading the phrase the first way seems contradictory. The thoughts 
are still yet given motion or sensation (the “itch”) through death, which would not make sense if 
it were not for the resonance between “tell me in my ear” and the section of Hamlet Stephen later 
quotes, “They list. And in the porches of their ears I pour” (188).12 Here, Stephen uses the 
reference to describe how he “pours” his thesis into his audience’s ears—“tell[ing] [them] in 
[their] ears,” as it were.13 The way the “still” thoughts “urge [Stephen] to wreak [their] will” is 
also reminiscent of the ghost of King Hamlet’s appeal to Hamlet, so perhaps the “still” thoughts 
entombed in the library act on Stephen as King Hamlet’s ghost acts on Hamlet from beyond the 
grave. This reading complements the second reading of “but an itch of death is in them,” which 
suggests that merely “an itch of death” is in the thoughts; they are, in some sense, alive in death, 
like a ghost, and they are shown to have agency—a “will”—of their own. A book, then, is not 
                                                          
12 A reference to Hamlet, I. V. 63-4 (U 844, note 188.36). 
13 The original context suggests (perhaps jestingly) that Stephen’s thesis is like poison to his 
listeners; this is not a wholly friendly debate. 
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only a physical place for mummified thoughts, nor simply a record of the author’s forms, but 
instead, the book becomes an agent with a degree of independence from the author. Specifically, 
at this moment, the “will” of the books around Stephen seems to be that he generate his Hamlet 
thesis; Stephen’s dual references to Hamlet link the library setting to the production of his 
argument. 
Thus, the agency that books have independent of their authors works to produce new 
texts, and the books themselves have the ability to prompt production. “Scylla and Charybdis” 
therefore frames the library as a generative space. The writers gathered in the library are 
speaking of literary production and the bringing-to-life of art, both through their discussion of 
promising new poets and through the continual references to performance.  As I noted in Chapter 
2, one member of Stephen’s audience remarks that “Mr. Russell, rumour has it, is gathering 
together a sheaf of our younger poets’ verses” (U 184). Mr. Russell (AE), who is in attendance 
for part of the episode, is in the midst of producing a book, reminding the reader that libraries 
can be sites of production as well as entombment. Furthermore, as Norris notes, the production 
of this volume of young poets’ work may be part of Stephen’s reason for sharing his Hamlet 
thesis to begin with: “does he decide to deliver his views on Hamlet in the hopes of impressing 
this coterie and perhaps reversing the two disappointments in store for him: his exclusion from 
Russell’s planned book of verses and his exclusion from George Moore’s evening soiree?” 
(Norris 4). AE’s production of a book of verses is in some ways prompting Stephen’s production 
of his thesis, just as the library environment itself seems to be. This emphasis on creation, and 
the graveyard library as the seat of creation, reinforces the idea of books as having a “will” to 
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create: ideas beget new ideas, books beget new books, and the library is not only a graveyard of 
thoughts but a womb.14 
Additionally, “Scylla and Charybdis” stresses the physical bringing-to-life of art. The 
Gilbert schema gives “Dialectic” as the “Technic” for the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode, and 
the dialectic as a genre renders thought physical through performance.15 In Platonic terms, 
“dialectic” refers to dialogue as a mode by which philosophy is created or disseminated 
(Meinwald). “Scylla and Charybdis” makes the dialectical form particularly overt through the 
way the book (and Stephen’s thesis) moves between prose-formatted conversation and moments 
of dialogue formatted as a play. As Peake argues, “The whole of [Stephen’s] speech in the 
library is a performance, as the style itself suggests” (205). This emphasizes the idea that 
Stephen’s conversation with AE is in fact a performative exploration of Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian theories of art and artist and, furthermore, suggests that “Scylla and Charybdis” can 
be brought to life physically in a way similar to Hamlet. The writers talking in the library in this 
episode are based on flesh-and-blood living contemporaries of Joyce, which in itself is a nod to 
the life-death mediation of literature that Stephen’s Hamlet thesis describes: Hamnet is preserved 
in and made flesh through Hamlet, and AE and the others are preserved and, if they are not made 
flesh exactly, they have the potential to be once the episode morphs into a dramatic form.  A 
                                                          
14 The tomb/womb relationship is a theme throughout Ulysses; for example, in “Proteus,” 
Stephen muses on the phonetic relationship between the two: “Oomb, allwombing tomb” (U 47). 
However, in a thesis of this scale, I cannot fully explore this motif. 
15 Only the Gilbert schema gives “Dialectic” as the “Technic” for this episode. That being said, 
Stephen himself mentions “Dialectic” in the episode, in reply to John Eglinton’s question, “What 
useful discovery did Socrates learn from Xanthippe?” (U 182-183). Thus, it seems that 
“Dialectic” has more of a tie to “Scylla and Charybdis” than many of the schematic elements 
have to their respective episodes. The Linati schema, on the other hand, lists the “Technic” of 
“Scylla and Charybdis” as “Whirlpools,” presumably in reference to Homer. I consider this yet 
another instance of the schemata confusing rather than clarifying the book—“Whirlpools” is a 
“Technic” tangentially at best—but I leave this particular discrepancy to the reader. 
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conversation between two people implies two humans with bodies; a conversation in play form 
implies two actors bringing thought to life. Shakespeare’s character Hamlet becomes flesh in the 
form of the actor Burbage on the Elizabethan stage, for example, making Hamlet both an idea 
produced by Shakespeare and a body put on stage by Shakespeare (U 181).16 Thus, both the 
content of Stephen’s thesis and the way Stephen’s thesis is presented draw attention to form (and 
the physicality implied by form) and mind in interaction: art becomes lived and acted, rather than 
simply dead and entombed. If the library is analogous to a womb, then the physical acting-out of 
art is akin to a birth. 
Notably, the library in “Scylla and Charybdis” generates both the ideas of new art and the 
enactment of new art. Stephen’s thesis comes into being both theoretically and physically, and 
theory and physicality are created together, enjoined through the dramatic form. The schematic 
designation of “Brain” as the “Organ” of “Scylla and Charybdis” emphasizes this interplay 
between physical and mental while pushing the idea of books as agents to a unique extreme. The 
brain is an organ which is constantly negotiating the boundary between physical and mental; it is 
the physical site of thought. “Scylla and Charybdis” is therefore presented as the physical part of 
Ulysses where the book’s thinking is done, or at least where the boundary between book-body 
and book-mind is most blurred. In this episode that draws such overt attention to the agency of 
the book as medium, Ulysses seems to be thinking about itself, and the fact that Ulysses is 
capable of doing so—that it has gained a “brain” in addition to its book-body, which is 
autonomous of its author’s body-mind—brings the relationship between the book and the author 
into question. 
                                                          
16 For more discussion on this, see Chapter 2. 
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Stephen’s theory explores the concept of the author as a ghost, but not only in the sense 
that Shakespeare plays a ghost in Hamlet. This ghost is invested in the art the author produces, 
reproducing a semblance of the author-mind within the work which can be understood as distinct 
from the live human author. Norris argues that 
a larger and intriguingly metafictional point that Stephen’s Hamlet theory has… 
made… is to identify James Joyce himself as Stephen’s ghost, as the author 
whose youthful wounds and lived life inevitably flow into the scene in the 
Library, into the character of Stephen, into Ulysses as a whole. (16) 
In Norris’ view, Joyce is Stephen’s ghost in the sense that Shakespeare is the ghost of Hamlet’s 
father, and Joyce has also embedded himself and his life into Ulysses, thus becoming a ghostly 
presence within the book. As I have discussed, Stephen envisions books as preservations of a 
form of the author, and Norris’ argument follows a similar line of reasoning, albeit in different 
terms. 
Intriguingly, Norris describes Shakespeare, Hamlet’s father, and Hamlet as being “fluid 
incarnations” of one another (15). Norris’ use of the word “fluid” is a bit vague and could imply 
a wavelike, back-and-forth, wavering boundary between the three. I find the boundary Norris 
discusses is best imagined not as a wave but as a neural network (since “Scylla and Charybdis” 
is, after all, a brain). Douglas Hofstadter, a professor of cognitive science specializing in artificial 
intelligence, has written that “the familiar and stable-seeming fluidlike properties of thought 
emerge as a statistical consequence of a myriad tiny, invisible, independent, subcognitive acts 
taking place in parallel” (3). Human thought appears fluid because of many constant tiny firings 
of neurons, which Hofstadter envisions as “flickering clusters” in reference to “a well-known 
theory of water according to which H2O molecules continually make fleeting little associations… 
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if they happen to be passing close enough by each other” (2). In a similar vein, the relationship 
between Shakespeare, Hamlet, and the ghost of King Hamlet appears fluid only because of a 
myriad fleeting associations: the small interactions between author and text, each self-aware nod 
the book gives to itself, builds an apparently “fluid” relationship between text and author. While 
Hofstadter envisions neurons firing to create thought in a great fluid network, Norris’ phrase 
evokes a vision of the ever-changing author-text relationship as a similarly fluid set of actions 
that, in Stephen’s terms, produce “thought”—that is, the meaning contained by the book. 
 Norris identifies that, in the same way that Stephen shows Shakespeare’s life as part of 
the creation of Hamlet and part of the work itself, Joyce can be understood as being part of 
Ulysses in a way that, when set against Hofstadter’s explanation of fluid thinking, resembles the 
physical, neurological production of thought. Norris’s argument is not entirely new. Stephen has 
long been understood as a semi-autobiographical young James Joyce, so viewing this character 
as an authorial intrusion or, in Stephen’s terminology, viewing Joyce as a “ghost” incarnated via 
Stephen, goes almost without saying. Norris does not limit her conclusion to Stephen alone, 
however. Joyce is not just Stephen’s ghost, in the same way that Shakespeare is not just the ghost 
of Hamlet’s father. In Norris’ thinking, Joyce’s authorial ghost is present in “Ulysses as a whole” 
(16). One could also say that Joyce’s authorial ghost is made flesh through Stephen, at least 
within the world of Ulysses, or Stephen is made flesh through Joyce outside the bounds of the 
book; the history between the two is longer than Ulysses alone. Jeri Johnson’s introduction to the 
Oxford World’s Classics edition of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the Joyce work 
centering on Stephen’s childhood and adolescence, points out that “when Joyce published the 
first versions of three stories that, revised, he included in Dubliners, he did so under the 
pseudonym ‘Stephen Daedalus’” (xiii). The line between author and character is thoroughly 
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blurred. Although they can and must be viewed as distinct entities, they nevertheless have a 
fluid, permeable relationship: Joyce is simultaneously Stephen’s ghost and Stephen embodied, 
both the body-mind producing Stephen and the product of his own body-mind, who is Stephen. 
According to the Neoplatonist ideal espoused by AE and even, seemingly, some of 
Joyce/Stephen’s earlier views, art transcends its human producer; however, Ulysses 
simultaneously emphasizes the presence of its author and the agency of the text. As I discussed 
in Chapter 2, AE’s artist is a great mind, someone with a deep inner life. This mind produces the 
work but, in AE’s view, the biography of the author is irrelevant, suggesting that the author 
himself becomes irrelevant through reaching a sort of Platonic truth of thought. Any critique of 
art, according to AE, should focus on the ideas contained in the work, and “All the rest is the 
speculation of schoolboys for schoolboys” (U 177). Stephen seems to present a similar idea in 
Portrait, specifically about drama: 
The dramatic form is reached when the vitality which has flowed and eddied 
round each person fills every person with such vital force that he or she assumes a 
proper and intangible esthetic life. The personality of the artist, at first a cry or a 
cadence or a mood and then a fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself out 
of existence, impersonalises itself, so to speak. (P 180-181) 
Here, Stephen argues that the artist’s self—their “personality”—fades gradually (yet actively, 
“impersonalis[ing] itself”). This implies something akin to AE’s view, in which the artist is a 
producer of a work but not necessarily involved in the work. Roland Barthes’ famous essay, 
“The Death of the Author” (1967), says something quite similar as well: “literature is… the trap 
where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes.” However, 
there is a difference between the artist becoming “impersonalized” in Joyce’s terms and the artist 
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losing “the very identity of [their] body,” and it is in this difference that the implications of 
Stephen’s argument in Ulysses, set against AE’s near-Barthesian disregard for the authorial 
body, become particularly striking. When the Stephen of Portrait remarks that the personality of 
the artist “refines itself out of existence,” he is not necessarily arguing that the personality of the 
artist becomes irrelevant or that the artist’s bodily experiences ought to be disregarded; instead, 
he implies something similar to the author-ghost I have been discussing. In Ulysses’s terms, the 
personality of the artist, by going “out of existence,” becomes a ghost. Let us return to Stephen’s 
definition of a ghost: “One who has faded into impalpability through death, through absence, 
through change of manners” (U 180). That which fades from existence falls into the category of 
a ghost through absence and, paradoxically, ghosts do actually exist in some sense. The artist 
may have “impersonalized” themselves, but they have not wholly erased themselves; rather than 
the irrelevance of the author that AE’s or Barthes’ arguments imply, the author is instead 
reconstructed within the work as a ghost of himself, or many ghosts, in fluid relation with the 
entire text. 
 In fact, Stephen’s stance in Portrait seems to be a rough draft of what he describes in 
Ulysses. In the same passage of Portrait I have just discussed, Stephen summarizes the role of 
the artist: “The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above 
his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (P 181). 
This is perhaps a loftier view of the artist than the one Stephen presents in Ulysses. Like AE, 
young Stephen views the artist as akin to a god rather than emphasizing the artist’s humanity and 
physicality; however, the paradoxical existence yet lack of existence that Stephen describes in 
Portrait is just what the author-ghost of Ulysses represents. Furthermore, in Ulysses, the 
“indifferent” artist of Portrait seems to have grown into an artist who is not only human and 
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physical but who is incapable of a god’s indifference. The artist becomes a new form of 
themselves, moves on from their work, perhaps completely changes their mind without 
discrediting their previous assertions, and in turn, the work in some sense becomes detached 
from the author, but the two remain imprinted upon one another even after they part ways. The 
artist owes no attachment to prior works and is in that sense “indifferent” but is at the same time 
invested, so invested that they must always be “within or behind or beyond” the work. 
At the same time, we must keep in mind that Ulysses is not entirely under the author’s 
control. This is true of any book. As I have discussed, books gain agency upon publication 
through their power to prompt new work and discussion, and the modes by which art is 
interpreted and reinterpreted are generally out of the artist’s control. However, Joyce is 
particularly aware of his own limited power. In a letter to Herbert Gorman, Joyce reportedly 
describes a dream in which his character Molly Bloom rejects her author with the words: “And I 
have done with you, too, Mr. Joyce,” suggesting that Joyce felt a certain anxiety that his own art 
was getting away from him (qtd. in Whittier-Ferguson 73). At the same time, Joyce constructs 
Ulysses as an easily adulterated text, as if encouraging the book’s growth independent of its 
author. The schemata, which Joyce initially drafted but which he immediately handed over to 
others for interpretation, are one such independence-encouraging feature. As I have discussed in 
Chapter 1, the schemata are simultaneously a part of Ulysses and separate documents, with 
authorship that is only partially shared and a long history of revision and reinterpretation. The 
relationship between the schemata and Ulysses is not something over which Joyce had full 
control; much of the schemata’s importance to the book lies in the emphasis that readers and 
scholars have placed on them over the years, an emphasis that has fluctuated. By sending his 
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little “schemes” out to a few friends, Joyce invited other people to interpret his book while 
simultaneously supplying more documents to discuss, fueling the interpretative fire. 
“Scylla and Charybdis” presents a view of the book and the author as simultaneously 
independent and interdependent. While Barthes and other later twentieth century theorists 
emphasize the text over the author, “Scylla and Charybdis” and, by extension, Ulysses takes a 
view of the text-author relationship as fluid. At some moments, text and author are inextricably 
linked: the author at the moment of writing is forever preserved in the work. Simultaneously, text 
and author diverge at certain points: the author grows, changes, and leaves behind only a ghost of 
their former self, while the book takes on a life of its own, both as an adulterated text and as the 
parent of new texts. In this way, the book, organism-like, grows and changes independently of its 
author, with agency—a “mind,” if you will—of its own. The book has a “will,” the ability to 
prompt new productions, as well as the ability to drive its own growth and change via external 
interpretation, but furthermore, as Joyce’s dream of Molly Bloom shows, the book itself can be 
envisioned as seeking its own freedom and insisting upon a certain distance between itself and 
the author. Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 2, everything that is woven and unwoven may be 
created and recreated by any number of things: “mother Dana,” a god, a parent, even a whole 
society goes into the original creation of a work as well as the continuous recreation of a work, 
so in a sense, Ulysses was never wholly Joyce’s doing to begin with. Ulysses is Ireland’s book, 
or Dana’s, or many other creators’, as much as it is Joyce’s. As “Scylla and Charybdis” comes to 
a close, Stephen reaches a similar conclusion, seeming to relinquish his thesis with the thought: 
“Cease to strive” (U 209). Stephen, like Joyce and like all authors, is unable to hold onto his 
work for any longer than the time it takes to create it. He has released his thesis into the world, 
and now he must cease to “strive,” meaning both “To contend, carry on a conflict of any kind” 
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(as in, cease carrying on his conflict with AE and the others, a conflict that has directly led to the 
production of the thesis) and “To struggle” with or against (as he ceases to struggle to maintain 
authorial control over his thesis) (“strive, v.”). The time has come for him to let go of the 
circumstances which gave rise to the thesis, move on, and become a new person, just as his thesis 
is left to the readers of “Scylla and Charybdis” to be interpreted and as the thesis itself, in a 





Yea, from the table of my memory 
I’ll wipe away all trivial fond records, 
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past 
That youth and observation copied there, 
And thy commandment all alone shall live 
Within the book and volume of my brain 
—Hamlet, Act I, Scene V, ll. 99-104 
 In the context of “Scylla and Charybdis,” the epigraph of this conclusion, taken from 
Prince Hamlet’s speech in response to the appearance of his father’s ghost, becomes an ironic 
reversal of Joyce’s episode. Hamlet, having been asked by his father to remember him, vows not 
only to remember King Hamlet but to forget all else, inscribing only the ghost’s will upon the 
“book and volume” of his brain. If Hamlet’s brain is indeed a book, then he has promised what 
we have seen to be impossible: that he should remember his creator and forget the “trivial” 
content of the past. As much as “Scylla and Charybdis” builds upon and plays off Hamlet, it also 
reverses the play: rather than a brain becoming a book, a book takes on a brain, and rather than a 
character vowing to remember his paternal (author) ghost, in Ulysses, the ghost is continually 
shrugged off, only to be picked up again, and collective cultural memories are kept, played with, 
even ingrained upon the book-body. Although the Gilbert schema as published in my Oxford 
edition of Ulysses lists Stephen as corresponding to Hamlet in the very first episode (see fig. 2), 
it seems that, by “Scylla and Charybdis,” Stephen has abandoned the loyalty to the father so 
characteristic of Hamlet—perhaps in a first step toward becoming the parent of a text himself. 
 This thesis seeks to prove that analogizing Ulysses as a bodied organism gives an 
incomplete view of the complexity of the text. By instead viewing the text as a body-mind, it 
becomes possible to see how authorship, text, and book-body interrelate. As Chapter 1 explored, 
the complex relationship Ulysses has with its author (or, if one includes those who published 
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and/or revised the schemata, authors) has shaped the physical forms the book takes. In Chapter 2, 
I discussed how the text of “Scylla and Charybdis” responds to and complicates questions of 
what a book and what an author can be, and, in Chapter 3, I argued that text and book-body 
together inform questions of authorship just as one’s readings of these aspects of Ulysses are 
informed by such questions. As many others have said, the complexity and strangeness of 
Ulysses makes the book seem like a living organism, but I assert that to use “organism” in such 
an analogy as only representative of a body is to deny the agency of the inhuman being, even 
when that inhuman being is in fact a physical object. 
 Furthermore, I hope that this thesis may complicate somewhat the discussions of the 
inhuman and of distributed agency in modernist studies at present. The September 2016 special 
issue of Modernism/modernity includes an introduction by Aaron Jaffe, who dwells heavily upon 
“the problem of modernity, the problem of too much information” (505). For Jaffe, the perpetual 
problem of modernism is a question of scale: what to do when trying to encompass vast expanses 
of time, or vast amounts of information: what to do when confronted by the constant onslaught 
of things allowed for by developing technologies. Jaffe tends to look at the modernist view of the 
“impossible whole” somewhat bleakly; the inability to see the forest for the trees, so to speak, is 
presented as a continual frustration and a source of collective anxiety (509). Readers of Joyce, I 
think, would probably agree that, rather than worry himself over this particular issue, Joyce 
seems to embrace it. If one were to view Ulysses itself as a tiny “impossible whole,” for 
example, the unifying structure of which has been a confounding question for many years, one 
might note that the shape and structure of the book does indeed often become confounded in the 
reader’s mind by the sheer overload of minutiae, and while I have attempted to clarify some of 
the framework of the book through my body-mind analogy, a thesis of this scale could not hope 
51 
 
to be more than a small gesture toward a comprehensive understanding of the complete book, 
whatever that is taken to mean. 
 Jaffe is correct to assert that scale, and the difficulty of impossibly large and complex 
wholes, is a question addressed in modernist texts, but his discussion of this facet of the inhuman 
in modernism, and particularly the way he links this issue to the tentacles of Cthulhu, suggests 
that the inhuman is somehow universally approached by modernists as alien, intrusive, and 
utterly unsettling. Yes, “probing, [being] probed by, and [being] propelled through an endless 
ooze of immaterial information” can be daunting but, at the same time, I would like to suggest 
that the endless connectivity can be quite beautiful, even necessary (Jaffe 509). “Scylla and 
Charybdis” makes this case in asserting that the artist alone is not responsible for art: art grows, 
adapts, and changes as new information is fed in by new critics and readers, art accepts new 
connections like synapses forming in a great brain, and art would not be possible without the 
constantly forged and reforged connections between people and the inhuman spaces and objects 
they encounter. For Joyce, the breakdown of the self-subject into constantly renegotiated and 
redistributed networks of agency is not a looming Cthulhu but an opportunity for creation and 
recreation. 
 Let us return to the title of this thesis, “Molecules all change,” which is taken from 
“Scylla and Charybdis” (U 182). This phrase is in many ways the key to how Joyce envisions 
questions of identity, mutability, and blurred boundaries. If molecules do indeed all change 
eventually, then there is no permanent “I,” no definitive boundary between the self and the other, 
no absolute body/mind binary, only constantly formed and reformed permutations of matter. As 
this thesis has shown, memory is a unifying factor, that which guards us against the complete 
loss of identity in the face of a boundless, constantly shifting universe. However, memory, like a 
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schema, is simply a way of organizing: an index of forms, which implies a link, but not an 
essential sameness, among those forms. That is, forms can be indexed in different orders or 
combinations with a different result and will still be an index of forms, linked through a logical 
organization into a “whole.” Ulysses embraces this inability to define the whole with its shifting 
forms and its many-versioned schemata. It is therefore unsurprising that the organism-like 
qualities of Ulysses are difficult to define. By viewing the text as a body-mind, I have at least 
been able to account for the interplay between the text as agent and the text as book-body, and by 
viewing the author as body-mind, I have been able to describe more precisely how details of the 
author’s physical existence permeate their apparently mental productions, but even this more 
complete analogy can only go so far. “Body-mind,” after all, also implies a closed-off system, a 
complete self that is, in Ulysses, more myth than reality. “Molecules all change” says, succinctly, 
what I have spent many pages trying to say: that in Joyce, everything and everyone is subject to 
change, reformation, and (re)connection. This attitude insists upon the mutability of identity, 
both of humans and of inhuman agents or objects, in a way that is not simply anxious but hopeful 
and exploratory. Whereas mysticism and other transcendental movements may focus on the 
interconnectivity of human souls, Joyce’s emphasis on the recreation of physical as well as 
spiritual identity shows that agents may share much more, down to their base molecular being, 
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